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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

(2) (12) 29p.
 (11) May 71
 6 January 1972

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (15 Dec 71) DAFD-OTT

AD 518831
DDC FILE COPY

SUBJECT: Operational Reports Lessons Learned, 97th MP Bn, 93rd MP Bn (21), (8)
 for Period Ending 30 Apr 1971 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION (9) Operational rept. for [REDACTED]
 period ending 30 Apr 71, (B4)

- 1 Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
- 2 The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.
4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, they have been omitted.

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(Distribution continued on page 2)

Verne L. Bowers
 VERNE L. BOWERS
 Major General, USA
 The Adjutant General

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AVBGP-IG

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) E4 Promotion Allocations.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the period November 1970 through April 1971, allocations to the 93d MP Battalion for promotion to E4 fluctuated from four (4) per month to seventy-one (71) per month.

(b) EVALUATION: Morale is greatly affected in that some months the allocations are such that individuals cannot be promoted until 10-11 months in grade while during other months, many allocations come down and individuals are promoted with minimum time in grade.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That E4 promotions be established on a time-in-grade basis. Individuals reaching this established time and recommended by their commander should be promoted. Additionally, an allowance should be made for a small percentage, i.e. 10%, of all personnel eligible to be promoted with less than the required time in grade for outstanding qualifications.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Highway Interdiction.

(a) OBSERVATION: In recent months, a noticeable increase in highway ambushes and mining incidents have been noticed in conjunction with an increase in military activity in Laos.

(b) EVALUATION: Any time military activity increases in any part of Indo-China, highway interdiction in support areas and attacks on air fields which are bases for providing combat support missions and/or supplies to the combat area can be expected.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Any time there is a noticeable increase in military hostilities in any part of Indo-China security should be increased, especially at airfields and on convoys in all areas which will provide support to the area of operations, regardless of the distance from the immediate area of hostilities.

c. Operations.

(1) Use of Wreckers on Convoys.

(a) OBSERVATION: In recent ambushes within the 93d MP Battalion's area of operations, the absence of recovery vehicles traveling with ambushed convoys caused an extended delay in clearing the roadway and at times the damaged vehicles were left in the roadway overnight.

(b) EVALUATION: Frequently a vehicle in a convoy breaks down and the convoy continues on, necessitating a security vehicle staying with the breakdown and decreasing the security force of the convoy. At other times, damaged vehicles are left in the roadway and become an obstruction and hazard to other traffic.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all convoys include either a wrecker-type vehicle or equipment which can be used to tow disabled vehicles.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3). (U) 15 May 1971

(2) Aerial Observation.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the anti-US demonstrations which occurred in the city of Qui Nhon during this reporting period, a helicopter was utilized by the Provost Marshal of MR 2 (N) for a four-hour period to observe the movement of demonstrators, to coordinate the operation of traffic control points at strategic intersections, and to coordinate communications between patrols, traffic control points, and the MP Desk. This means of observing the demonstrators from the air enabled the military police to notify compound commanders of the exact time the demonstrators would be in the area of any given compound, as well as the precise nature and extent of their activities.

(b) EVALUATION: Aerial observation was very effective in monitoring the movement and activities of the demonstrators. Without it, the command was somewhat "blind" and could receive only scattered, less-than-accurate, and untimely reports of activity.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That aerial observation be incorporated in contingency plans with local authorities for similar operations.

(3) V-100 Employment Concept.

(a) OBSERVATION: As areas within the Republic of Vietnam become more secure and the threat of enemy interdiction on the highways becomes less, new concepts of V-100 employment should be developed which are more applicable to the present situation than the old concept of direct convoy escort.

(b) EVALUATION: When V-100's are utilized as mobile highway patrols rather than as direct escorts to convoys, they are better able to perform the important functions of traffic and defile control, enforcement of highway regulations; and the monitoring of road conditions and convoy discipline. Pertinent information regarding these activities is routinely furnished convoy commanders and highway traffic control elements, as appropriate.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Recommend that commanders with V-100's available to them consider the employment of V-100's as mobile highway patrols as an alternative to their employment as direct escorts to convoys, depending on the nature of their operations and enemy situation.

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15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion; Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

d. Organization.

(1) Area Provost Marshal Concept.

(a) OBSERVATION: The current provost marshal organizational concept for Battalion and lower level operations calls for the manning of most local military police stations and sub-activities by personnel under a "double-hat" configuration. At battalion level, the respective stations deal directly with the battalion staff on all administrative and operational matters, predominantly the S3/Operations Office. The TOE provost marshal detachments within the brigade normally provide the administrative and operational overhead for a single major military police station.

(b) EVALUATION: Under the "double-hat" concept, many unit commanders/officers, NCO's, and EM are tasked to operate military police stations and sub-activities while continuing to support their "normal" unit requirements. While it may be possible to adequately accomplish both missions at locations where the station administrative workload is minimal, it is not practical at major station level. Here, provost marshal reports, correspondence, and statistical data are prepared/compiled, edited, finalized, and distributed in a volume characteristic of CONUS post, camp, and station (PCS) operations, where there is a requisite number of personnel dedicated solely to support such operations. Here, the negative impact on units required to provide these personnel assets to the stations while continuing to meet equally important unit requirements, is considerable. A similar negative impact occurs on battalion staff activity, particularly in the S3/Operations Office. The several military police stations respond directly to the staff on all administrative and operational matters, i.e., all reports, correspondence, and similar requirements, are imposed over the "normal" staff workload. Included are the area-wide services for physical security inspections and surveys, and serious incident reporting. The resultant expansion of the staff sections to handle this PCS level of activity cannot be accomplished within authorized battalion headquarters' assets. The result is the augmentation of the staff sections either by overstrength assignment or the attachment of personnel from subordinate units. Neither alternative is desirable. Finally, the provost marshal detachments are inadequately organized in terms of numbers, grade, or MOS structure, to provide the overhead personnel for even a single major military police station. However, when properly augmented, they can support area-wide services and the overhead personnel, less desk teams, for each of the several major stations and minimal staffing for sub/combined stations under the consolidated area concept. The Detachment Commander is designated

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USBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

as the Deputy Provost Marshal for the battalion's AO and serves as the Battalion Commander's/Area Provost Marshal's principal representative for directing a consolidated organization within clearly defined lines of communication and responsibility. The augmentation of the detachment(s) should be accomplished by MTOE revision. If not possible, a minimal number of attached personnel in the appropriate grade and MOS, are attached from the several units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Deputy Provost Marshal/Area concept of detachment employment be examined and considered for brigade-wide implementation to the extent practicable.

e. Training.

(1) V-100 Familiarization.

(a) OBSERVATION: Incoming military policemen are unfamiliar with most aspects of the V-100 Armored Car.

(b) EVALUATION: Newly assigned personnel to RVN are not familiar with the operation, safety, maintenance, and weaponry of the V-100 Armored Car. Units are required to train these individuals taking approximately three weeks of on the job training utilizing valuable time of both key personnel and newly arrived personnel. Since the V-100's are on the road daily and often operate long distances from the home base, it is essential to have a knowledge of the maintenance aspects of the vehicle.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: A more thorough training program is needed consisting of operation and maintenance aspects of the V-100 Armored Car. Rather than have military police trainees simply shown the vehicle at Military Police Advanced Individual Training, all trainees should have a complete training program covering all the aspects of the V-100 Armored Car.

f. Logistics.

(1) M-73 Machine Guns.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 560th Military Police Company has experimented by modifying the V-100 with the addition of a machine gun mount just right forward of the driver's hatch. This mount accepts the M-73 machine gun.

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(b) EVALUATION: This addition provides added fire power to the front and flanks and releases the turret gunner to occupy himself to fire toward the sides while the RTO man can cover the rear. This extra mount can be utilized to fire in approximately a 180° arc.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the installation of this mount be evaluated by higher headquarters and, if found to be practical, adopted as a standard item on V-100's conducting convoy escort duty in RVN.

(2) Improvement of rivets on M-60 Machine Gun.

(a) OBSERVATION: After briefly firing the M-60 machine gun, the magazine bracket rivets and receiver rivets normally become loose. This deficiency cannot be corrected at the organizational level. Consequently, it must be sent to higher echelon maintenance for repairs which makes them unavailable for approximately three to five weeks.

(b) EVALUATION: Although this does not render the weapon inoperable, it does create a major deficiency for inspection purposes. Furthermore, the loss of the weapons for such an extended period weakens perimeter security at defensive positions which are usually armed with the M-60 machine gun.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: A type of rivet or similar type device should be developed which would enable the weapon to be expeditiously and economically repaired at unit level to preclude the loss of the weapon for extended periods.

(3) Malfunction of M-73 Machine Gun.

(a) OBSERVATION: Units of the 93d MP Battalion have experienced problems with the M-73 machine gun.

(b) EVALUATION:

- 1 The receiver assembly cracks inside and out.
- 2 The plate assembly, back with solenoid, becomes inoperative both electrically and manually; gun cannot be fired.
- 3 The slide assembly feed feeds ammo improperly.
- 4 The guide rate control malfunctions and causes an uncontrolled rate of fire.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this information be passed on to the manufacturer as a deficiency, in hopes that an improvement may be made. At this time the 560th MP Company is in the process of exchanging the M-73 machine gun for a newer model (M-73E1) which is a better constructed weapon and gives better performance than the earlier model.

(4) V-100 Power Failure.

(a) OBSERVATION: The V-2 (15 Amp) circuit breaker after being on for an extended period of time cuts out, thus causing a power loss in the V-100.

(b) EVALUATION: When the power of the vehicle is shut off, drivers attempt to start the vehicle, while it is still moving, by disengaging the clutch, thus losing the power steering and brakes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that when the electrical system is found to be the cause of the power failure, then the whole electrical system should be checked. This check should be made by use of the low voltage circuit tester which is part of the organizational equipment. Also the operators of the vehicle should be instructed not to disengage the power when a power failure occurs while moving.

(5) V-100 Communications.

(a) OBSERVATION: Communication problems have been encountered on the V-100 Armored Cars because of the noise interference from the engine. Since the RTO is located near the engine some type of communication helmet or head set must be utilized to eliminate the excessive noise and allow other members of the crew to both monitor the radio and communicate with each other.

(b) EVALUATION: Members of the V-100 Armored Car crews have used three types of helmets and headsets and have encountered problems with each.

1 The GVC helmet (tanker helmet) has been found to be extremely uncomfortable to those utilizing it for extended periods of time. It does not have a transparent shield for protecting the individual's face against wind and dust.

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2 The MK 1039-6 Flight helmet does have a transparent shield but has proven to be the most comfortable. To function properly, though, it uses maximum electrical power and overworks the entire intercom system.

3 The H-161/U headset-microphone kit has the best communication for the V-100 Armored Car. The H-140G/R headset and M-800/U microphone becomes uncomfortable when a steel helmet is worn over it and no transparent shield is provided.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: There are two possible means to solve the communication problem:

1 The CVC helmet could be remodeled for more personal comfort with an attached transparent shield.

2 A helmet with a transparent shield could be manufactured for the H-140G/R headset. This improved helmet could be authorized and adopted by the United States Army as an organic element of the V-100 communication system.

g. Communications.

(1) Improvement of the H-189/GR Hand Set Electrical Cable.

(a) OBSERVATION: After moderate use of the H-189/GR hand set, in conjunction with the AN/VRC-46, the insulation on the electrical cable near the hand set cracks and the cable tears from the microphone. This deficiency cannot be corrected at the organizational level and must be sent to support maintenance for repairs. Consequently, they are unavailable for approximately four days.

(b) EVALUATION: When forwarded for repairs, the handsets would normally leave the AN/VRC-46 inoperable due to the absence of a microphone. The electrical cable deficiency could cause a military police patrol to lose contact with the base station and may possibly preclude the accomplishment of an important mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A longer hand set electrical cable should be developed which would minimize the stress placed on the cable when utilized by personnel situated in the front seat of the vehicle. The insulation on the electrical cable should also be made from a more durable and pliable material that would endure its constant usage.

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
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15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

h. Material. None.

i. Other. None.


JAMES P. DUFFY, JR.
LTC, MPC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Commander-In-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GROP-DT, APO 96558
- 3 - Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375
- 5 - Commanding Officer, 16th MP Gp, ATTN: AVEGF-B, APO 96349

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AVBGF-B (15 May 71) 1st Ind
 SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 93rd Military Police
 Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 16TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APO 96349 26 May 1971

TO: Commanding General, 18th Military Police Brigade, ATTN: AVBGC-O,
 APO San Francisco 96491

1. (U) The 93rd Military Police Battalion's ORIL for the semi-annual reporting period ending 30 April 1971 is submitted.

2. (U) The enclosed report has been reviewed, has been found to be a comprehensive historical record of that unit's activities, and is considered very adequate. The following comments refer to referenced sections of the report:

a. Reference para 2a: Non-concur. This headquarters has no control over the number of allocations received from the 18th Military Police Brigade. Moreover, while there have been periodic fluctuations in the number of allocations received each month, allocations are distributed on the basis of position vacancies. It is not feasible for allocations to be distributed on a strict time-in-grade basis within the 16th Military Police Group. It is felt that this criterion could best be implemented at battalion or company level.

b. Reference para 2b: Concur. An increase in enemy initiated activity may generally signal the commencement of an enemy "highpoint". Commanders should take those precautionary measures of increasing security as necessary during such periods.

c. Reference para 2c (1): Concur. This same observation was made by another battalion independently and by a liaison officer from this headquarters during the course of Operation LAM SON 719 in northern Quang Tri Province.

d. Reference para 2c (2): Concur. When aircraft are available, aerial observation can be extremely valuable in such situations as described.

e. Reference para 2c (3): Concur. When an MCC (Movement Control Center) does not routinely furnish reliable convoy information to the military police, the use of the V-100 in a highway patrol role is the only feasible alternative. This method of employment was used successfully in northern Quang Tri Province during the course of Operation LAM SON 719. Aside from giving the commander a greater degree of operational flexibility, the use of V-100's in a highway patrol role allows for greater coverage and requires that convoy commanders provide their own security, rather than depending strictly upon the military police.

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AVBGF-B (15 May 71) 1st Ind 26 May 1971
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 93rd Military Police
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

An additional benefit that can be derived is that routine patterns are not established, which the enemy could be monitoring.

f. Reference para 2d: Non-concur. While this evaluation of the Area Provost Marshal Concept points out certain personnel problems encountered in establishing several military police stations within existing battalion resources, it is the opinion of this headquarters that sufficient NCO positions exist in the present MP company MTC 19-37G to fulfill the requirements. The MCS 95B indicates that each individual has sufficient knowledge and experience in each grade level to perform as desk sergeants, patrol supervisors, or as operations sergeants. The operation of military police stations is also a part of the mission statement of IO & E 19-37G. Moreover, the Battalion Commander is allowed sufficient latitude in MP operations to augment existing headquarters by attaching necessary personnel in appropriate grades and MCS's to perform required missions.

g. Reference para 2e: Concur. Recommend that the 18th MP Brigade bring this matter to the attention of the Director of Instruction, USAMPS, such that appropriate changes could be made to the POI.

h. Reference para 2f (1): Concur. The 97th Military Police Battalion has prepared photographs of this kind of conversion and is requesting that this modification be approved through appropriate channels.

i. Reference para 2f (2): Concur. The unit making the recommendation should submit an EIR (Equipment Improvement Recommendation) as outlined in para 3-7, TM 38-750. Disposition instructions for the completed DA Form 2407 (EIR) are found in Appendix III, USARV Regulation 750-20.

j. Reference para 2f (3): Concur. This problem has been experienced throughout the 16th Military Police Group. Unserviceable M-73's are in the process of being turned in and contact has been made with the S-4, 18th Military Police Brigade, in hopes that a more expeditious replacement of the M-73 with the M-73E1 will be effected.

k. Reference para 2f (4): Concur. A letter from the 16th Military Police Group dated 13 May 1971, Subject: Braking and Steering Problems in the XM-706 Armored Car, was sent to each battalion explaining the problems encountered during engine failure in the vehicle and describing appropriate immediate action. One specific point was that the vehicle be left in gear upon engine failure.

l. Reference para 2f (5): Concur. The second recommendation could have wider application than for V-100 crewmen alone. Recommend

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AVBGF-B (15 May 71) 1st Ind 26 May 1971
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 93rd Military Police
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

that the unit bring this to the attention of the Army Materiel Command through participation in the suggestion program.

m. Reference para 2g: Concur. The same thing would happen if the M-80/U microphone were used. The trouble stems from the cable not being long enough and too much side pressure being applied as the operator stretches the handset to the front seat. Recommend that the unit concerned submit an EIR as outlined in para 2i, above.

David J. Anderson
DAVID J. ANDERSON
LTC, MPC
Commanding

CF: CO, 93rd MP Bn

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AVEGG-P (15 May 71) 2d Inf 15 June 1971
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 93d Military
Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO,
APO 96375

1. Comments on Significant Activities:

a. Page 4, para 1c(7) Should read:

(a) As of 1 Nov 70:

	AUTH		
OFF	WO	EM	TOTAL
22	2	536	560

(b) As of 30 Apr 71:

	AUTH		
OFF	WO	EM	TOTAL
22	2	515	539

b. Page 11, para 1g: During the period cited, detailed MTOEs were submitted for all 93d Military Police Battalion units per USARPAC requirement. Approved detailed documents have not been received, rather, new summary MTOEs were received for the 66th, 127th, and 560th Military Police Companies drawing those units down by a total of twenty-one enlisted spaces.

2. Comments on Lessons Learned:

a. Page 11, para 2a: Non-concur: DA and USARV provide allocations for promotion to grade E4 based on the number of eligibles. Sole use of a time-in-grade factor would be detrimental to qualitative selection for promotion.

b. Page 11, para 2c: Non-concur: Only a portion of those personnel going through MP Advanced Individual Training will eventually be assigned duty with the V-100 Armored Car. To expend more time on this subject beyond the brief orientation they currently get would be a waste of valuable instruction time.

c. Page 11, para 2d: Concur: However, the recent MTOE update afforded all Brigade units the opportunity to closely scrutinize their current authorization documents and propose reorganization under revised authorization criteria. The 19-37G TCE does not provide the tacit capability of operating quasi-permanent military police stations/provost marshal offices, rather, its organization is most amenable to fluid, non-stabilized combat environments. Sufficient administrative overhead and officer-noncommissioned officer supervisor positions are not provided for by TCE 19-77G either. While implementation of this concept could have transpired much earlier, personnel and equipment authorizations for specific locations required a dedicated military police station or provost marshal office could be organized utilizing applicable 19-500G TCE cellular teams to a much greater degree than at present. Instead of expanding the six cellular provost marshal detachments, additional cellular detachments, tailored specifically to their respective locale would be activated by MTOE or

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
AVRGC-P

SUBJECT: Operational Report & Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

MTDA documentations (although the MTDA alternative better adapts to the stabilized situation in Vietnam). Certain areas in Vietnam will not accommodate the detachment commander/deputy area provost marshal concept. In general, these areas are the densely-populated urban areas where the detachment commander is fully occupied with discipline, law, and order functions within his primary area of responsibility leaving little opportunity to monitor exterior matters.

3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER


FRANK L. BURNS *1st Lt, HHC*
MAJ, MPC
Adjutant

CF:
CC, 16th MP Gp
CO, 93d MP Bn

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AVHDO-DO (15 May 71) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 93d Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 24 AUG 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 93d Military Police Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


F. L. KONSOWETZ
CPT. / AGC.
Adjutant General

Cy furn:
93d MP Bn
18th MP Bde

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GPOP-FD (15 May 71) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 93d Military
Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVEGF-JB

1 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons: Learned, 97th Military Police
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, MCS CS70R-65 (R3) (U)

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) OBSERVATION: During the period 29 Jan 71 to 8 Apr 71, 102 personnel of the 97th Military Police Battalion were attached to the 504th MP Battalion in connection with Operation Lam Son 719. During this period, considerable turbulence was experienced regarding the processing of personnel, pay, judicial action, etc. The operations order for this operation specified that Personnel, Health and Dental

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Records would accompany the personnel to unit of attachment and that pay records remain with the parent servicing Finance Officer. Within the 97th Military Police Battalion, the Operations Order was implemented to provide that only the Health and Dental Records would accompany personnel to unit of attachment. It was considered more advantageous to the personnel administrative requirements that both the Personnel and Finance Records remain with the parent unit. Additionally, the continued requirements of verifying and monitoring DFU Rosters, AOR Rosters and several other reports could only be effectively controlled by retaining possession of these records during the attachment period.

(2) EVALUATION: The difficulties in providing effective liaison between the parent unit and unit of attachment and to provide clear channels for processing administrative actions caused delays in the timely processing of personnel actions, particularly those dealing with Extension of FST, Request for Special Leave and R&R requests.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: In future operations, the provisions for maintaining Personnel Records remain with the parent unit. That a more effective liaison be established between units to afford for the orderly processing of administrative and financial actions. Further, that personnel be fully apprised of their channels of communication during periods of attachment.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

(1) Physical Security.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Physical Security Program in USARV, as implemented by USARV Reg 190-30, dtd 30 July 1969, requires that responsible commanders submit requests for Physical Security Surveys up to a year in advance of their actually being conducted. Due to the existing rate of U.S. Forces withdrawal from the Republic of Vietnam and the expected increase of that rate, and in conjunction with the high turn-over in personnel inherent in a 12 month tour, many commanders either neglect to submit requests or are unaware of their responsibilities. The Physical Security Sections as employed under the auspices of the area Provost Marshal are also required to submit reports to their headquarters delineating their responsibilities for the forthcoming calendar or fiscal year.

(b) EVALUATION: It is inconceivable at this time to initiate a program of Physical Security education of the scope necessary to insure compliance on a year to year basis. It is also impractical for the Physical Security Sections to continue to submit reports on a yearly basis, which must inherently be erroneous or misleading.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That requests for Physical Security Inspections and Surveys be solicited on a day to day basis, and that, upon their receipt, they should be scheduled within the capabilities of the receiving office, and that the yearly report of projected surveys and inspections be deleted and the existing monthly reports be modified to provide the necessary information to higher headquarters.

(2) Communications.

(a) OBSERVATION: With an increase in Military Police sub-station and combined police stations throughout the area, frequently there arises a need for close coordination of communication between mobile units and base stations providing for more flexibility and versatility than is currently available.

(b) EVALUATION: A communication system is needed that is capable of monitoring and transmitting to more than one station or operation in the local and surrounding area without foregoing the use of the primary frequency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The radio AN/VRC-47, W/RT-524 and R-442 receiver has the capability of performing this mission by monitoring both the primary station along sub-station or operation. If a transmission to the sub-station is required, then the transmitting frequency can be momentarily changed, the message sent, and then immediately returned to the primary frequency.

d. Organization: None

e. Training

(1) OBSERVATION: Mandatory gunfire training for Sentry Dogs is being conducted on the rifle range at scheduled intervals. On scheduled days, the handler and his animal are transported to the range where the handler will fire twenty (20) rounds and the instructor will fire twenty (20) rounds over the animal's head.

(2) EVALUATION: This type of training is designed primarily for those animals who are currently walking but are rarely exposed to any type of fire. Its purpose is to familiarize the animal to gunfire and increase his confidence in his handler. It is felt that current procedures tend to endanger the purpose rather than accomplish it. Using the present procedures, the animal is exposed to too much volume fire. After a truck ride (which tends to excite him) he must wait off the firing line for orders to fire. During this time he is exposed to fire from the line and by the time the animal reaches the firing line, he is either in a state of uncontrollable agitation or has been frightened completely and is cowering.

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(3) RECOMMENDATION: For complete effectiveness on post, it is necessary that the animal relate to the sound of gunfire, in the sense that he is not threatened by it. This training must be done gradually and increased slowly to the desired point. Recommend, that initially, the gunfire training be incorporated in scouting or obedience problems. This could be done by having a shotgun fired into a sand barrel sporadically, during the normal training. The distance between the animal and the firer could be gradually shortened until it would be possible to fire over the dog with no adverse effects. It is felt that this type of training would be far more realistic and much more effective.

f. Logistics.

(1) OBSERVATION: Vehicle maintenance has a significant impact on the accomplishment of a Law Enforcement mission. Military Police vehicle use is extensive due to a 24 hour commitment. Without proper priority placed on maintenance and repair of these vehicles there becomes a serious safety problem. Military Police Commanders are burdened with responsibility of insuring that proper motor maintenance and vehicle repair procedures are closely monitored.

(2) EVALUATION: Maintenance and repair of vehicles at times becomes a problem of obtaining the complete new part for replacement. To counteract this problem of having vehicles inoperative, the parts are reconstructed of available new components and operable used components. This operation reduces the life of the new component by approximately one-half.

(a) Example 1: The replacement of universal joints in M151A1 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck. Complete universal joints are often not available within the supply channel. Therefore the housing of the old universal joint and needle bearings of a new universal joint for a different model are combined to replace the inoperative one. The new parts then come in direct contact with the old parts and cause additional wear on the new components, thus reducing the life of the replacement part. This causes the vehicle to become inoperative for the same problem in a shorter period of time than it would have if the complete new part had been available for replacement. The same problem is true in direct support maintenance.

(b) Example 2: The replacement of a fly wheel. The new fly wheel then comes in direct contact with a worn but servicable starter Bendix and causes undue wear to the flywheel.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that replacement of parts be complete to get the maximum use from the new part. If this involves a direct support capacity the complete chain should be replaced. Servicable

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but worn components should be stock piled, then they can be individually replaced in lieu of new parts. This would get the maximum utilization from all replacement parts.

g. Communications. None


h. Material. Use of M-60 MG in Conjunction With M-73 MG.

(1) OBSERVATION: The M-73 machine guns mounted on the XM-706 armored car, continue to misfire both in training exercises and under enemy attack.

(2) EVALUATION: The M-73 machine gun can, when matched up with the proper barrels and firing mechanisms, perform efficiently, but due to a shortage of these properly matched weapons, an alternate system must be incorporated to utilize in conjunction with the M-73's to provide back-up support.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: The M-60 machine gun apparently provides the best results. The most beneficial firing position for all around fire superiority is to affix an M-60 mount by the assistant driver traversing 360 degrees, and giving the operator an effective field of fire to the front and right side of the vehicle. Also, two additional mounts can be affixed on each side of the radio operator's hatch, giving an effective field of fire on both sides and to the rear of the vehicle.

i. Other. None



WILLIAM G. PETERS

LTC, IPC
Commanding

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- 5-Commanding Officer, 16th Military Police Group, ATTN: AVBGF-B, APO 96349

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A/OPF-3 (1 May 1971) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (73) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 16TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APC 96349 26 May 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The 97th Military Police Battalion's CMLL for the semi-annual reporting period ending 30 April 1971 is submitted.

2. (C) The inclosed report has been reviewed and is considered adequate. The following comments refer to referenced sections of paragraph 1 of the report:

a. Reference para 1c (5): Authorized/employed figures for civilian personnel should read as follows--

	AUTHORIZED	EMPLOYED
Augmentation TDA	85	82
Program Six Civilianization	6	6
Total	91	88

Current authorization documents which affected this reporting period were not received by this headquarters until 17 May; therefore, the unit could not report the correct authorized figures. Current authorization documents have been forwarded to this unit.

b. Reference para 1d: Operations and activities should have been reported in chronological order as required in AR 525-15. Unit has been notified.

c. Reference para 1f (1): Substitute the words "Headquarters, Second Regional Assistance Group" for "I Field Force Vietnam Hqs".

d. Reference para 1f (2): Add the following: On 3 February 1971, a noncommissioned officer lost a classified strip map (CONFIDENTIAL) showing highway convoy points. The loss occurred when the HCC and the other occupant of the 1/2 ton vehicle were rendering aid at the scene of a traffic accident. Investigation disclosed that the HCC had a bonafide need to have the document in his possession due to the nature of his duties and further, that the document was apparently stolen by a local national at the scene. As the loss occurred off a

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A-3 (1 May 71) 1st Ind 26 May 1971

RE JCRC: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

US-controlled installation, the possibility of a compromise cannot be discounted.

3. (U) The following comments refer to referenced sections of paragraph 2 of the report:

a. Reference para 2a (2): Deployment LOI published by this headquarters provided for direct co-ordination between the parent battalion and the battalion of attachment. Existing means of communication, including radio teletype, could have been used to facilitate this co-ordination.

b. Reference para 2a (3): Concur with so much of the recommendation that pertains to personnel records remaining with the parent battalion.

c. Reference para 2c (1): Non-concur with the recommendation as stated. There must be some means of programming the work load in advance to assure the most efficient use of manpower as well as providing for necessary staff supervision of the physical security program. It is recognized that the scheduling of surveys a year in advance at this particular stage of the Vietnamese Conflict may not be completely valid, with troop withdrawals accelerating. Recommend that consideration be given to a semi-annual, rather than annual, programming.

d. Reference para 2c (2): Concur. The AM/VRG 47 was designed to provide this capability.

e. Reference para 2e: Concur. The method suggested would allow for gradual conditioning of the animals, as well as enhancing training by interjecting a greater degree of realism.

f. Reference para 2f: Concur with the recommendation as stated.

g. Reference para 2h: Concur. The 97th MP Battalion has documented this recommendation, made photographs of the desired conversion, and is requesting approval of this modification through appropriate channels.

Randy Anderson
DAVID J. ANDERSON
LTC, 1 PG
Commanding

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AVBGC-P (1 May 71) 2d Ind 15 June 1971
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 97th Military
 Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDC-DO,
 APO 96375

1. Comments on Significant Activities:

a. Page 4, para 1c(7) Should read:

(a) As of 1 November 1970

	AUTH		
OFF	WO	EM	TOTAL
23	2	535	560

(b) As of 30 April 1971

	AUTH		
OFF	WO	EM	TOTAL
23	2	551	576

b. Page 6, para 1d(3): Add: On 15 November 1970, the Brigade PW Collection Point at Phan Thiet was closed in conjunction with the dissolution of Task Force South.

c. Page 11, para 1i(2)(b): USARPAC General Order 255, dated 7 May 1971 reorganized the 981st Military Police Company (SD) under MTOE 19-500EP518, P50270 which authorizes 182 rifles, 5.56 mm: w/e (M-16).

2. Comments on Lessons Learned:

a. Page 14, para 2a(3), Concur: 201 file and Qualification Records (DA Forms 20 and 66) should remain with the parent unit when smaller elements are detached for a specific operation and will return on completion of the operation.

b. Page 14, para 2c(1), Non-concur: Reasons stated in 1st Ind. Annual programming should present no problems as procedures have been established to update the consolidated list. Per letter, subject: Physical Security Surveys, dated 18 February 1971, USARV indicated that, "In the preparation of the FY 72 schedule consideration should be given to scheduling those installations/facilities with the longest life expectancy prior to those expected to relocate or terminate.

c. Page 16, para 2e(3), Concur: Coverage of gunfire training is completely inadequate in FM 20-20. Paragraph 122 Air Force Manual 125-5, dated 15 April 1968 contains a comprehensive coverage of this particular subject. Since the Air Force Manual is generally superior to FM 20-20 recommend that consideration be given to designating it as a field manual also.

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
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 97th Military
Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFCR-65 (R3) (U)

3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


FRANK L. BURNS
MAJ, MPC
Adjutant

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AVHDO-DO (1 May 71) 3rd Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 24 AUG 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 97th Military Police Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters with the exception of page 16, paragraph 2f and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3f. The proposed repair parts procedure is not economically or operationally feasible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


F.L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Adjutant General

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
GPOP-FD (1 May 71) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 97th Military
Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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CO, 97th MP Bn CO, 93rd MP Bn		
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13. ABSTRACT		

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